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Abstract—Electronic tickets (e-tickets) are electronic versions
of paper tickets, which enable users to access intended services
and improve services’ efficiency. However, privacy may be a
concern of e-ticket users. In this paper, a privacy-preserving
electronic ticket scheme with attribute-based credentials is pro-
posed to protect users’ privacy and facilitate ticketing based on
a user’s attributes. Our proposed scheme makes the following
contributions: (1) users can buy different tickets from ticket sell-
ers without releasing their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the
same user cannot be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to
another user; (4) a ticket cannot be double spent; (5) the security
of the proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to well-
known (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumption; (6) the
scheme has been implemented and its performance empirically
evaluated. To the best of our knowledge, our privacy-preserving
attribute-based e-ticket scheme is the first one providing these
five features. Application areas of our scheme include event or
transport tickets where users must convince ticket sellers that
their attributes (e.g. age, profession, location) satisfy the ticket
price policies to buy discounted tickets. More generally, our
scheme can be used in any system where access to services is
only dependent on a user’s attributes (or entitlements) but not
their identities.
Index Terms—Anonymity, Attribute-based Credentials,
Privacy-enhanced Authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to their flexibility and portability, electronic ticket(e-ticket) systems have been extensively investigated
by both industry [1]–[3] and the academic research commu-
nities [4]–[6]. E-tickets are attractive to transport operators
as well as customers because they can reduce paper costs
(tickets can be stored on a hand-held device) and improve
customer experience (tickets can be purchased and delivered
any time and anywhere). However, the use of e-tickets also
raises many questions regarding the privacy of its users due
to the possibility of linking different e-ticket transactions to a
particular user –in contrast to anonymous paper-based tickets–
and thus potentially revealing private information, e.g. working
patterns, likely places of work, etc.
Therefore, an important area of research is the design
of e-ticket systems which preserve customer privacy and,
moreover, can be formally proven to be secure. Anonymous
authentication, which enables users to authenticate without
revealing their identities, has been used to protect a user’s
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privacy in many privacy-preserving e-ticket schemes [4], [7]–
[11]. However, many of these schemes were not formally
proven to be secure. Notable exceptions are those proposed
by Arfaoui et al. [8] and Rupp et al. [12]. Arfaoui et al. [8]
formally defined their security models for e-ticket schemes,
including unforgeability, unlinkability and non-repudiation,
but the authors only provided a very high-level proof. Rupp et
al. [12] formalised their security models of privacy-preserving
pre-payments with refunds schemes including transportation
authority security and user privacy but the security proof of
their scheme was again at a high level. Another requirement of
a realistic e-ticket systems is the support for different tickets
based on a user’s attributes (e.g. age, location, disability,
profession, etc.), i.e. to offer discounts for, say, students or
disabled passengers. However, if not implemented carefully,
there is a risk that such a ticket system reveal more information
about a user than necessary when purchasing or validating
tickets. For example, a student buying a discounted student
ticket may end up revealing the university at which she is
enrolled and, depending on the student card, even her birthday
neither of which is relevant to obtaining the student discount.
The minimum proof required is that she can demonstrate that
she is a legitimate student. Similarly, a disable passenger might
need to reveal more details about his disability to the ticket
issuer or verifier than necessary for purchasing or verifying a
ticket. Gudymenko [10] and Kerschbaum et al. [11] addressed
this issue, but their schemes were not proven formally.
Transport operators are naturally concerned about fraudulent
use of e-tickets due to the easy with which they can be copied.
Double spend or more generally overspend detection, i.e. the
process of determining whether a ticket has been used too
many times, is therefore also an important feature that an e-
ticket scheme should support.
To address the above requirements, this paper proposes a
new privacy-preserving e-ticket scheme using attribute-based
credentials which supports issuing different tickets depending
on a user’s attributes. Our scheme protects an honest user’s
privacy while allowing for the de-anonymisation of users
who try to use their tickets more than once (double spend
detection). It is also a general e-ticket system and can be used
in various application scenarios including:
• mobility as a service transport tickets (e.g. rail, bus, etc.)
where age, disability, profession, affiliation, etc.might
determine the prices of tickets;
• one-off token for Internet services (e.g. print service,
download service for multimedia, etc.) where age, affil-
iation, membership might determine the service/access
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
03
01
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 J
un
 20
18
2level;
• e-Voting where age, nationality, voting district, etc.might
determine the voting ballot that should be issued;
• event tickets (e.g. concert, tourist attractions, conferences,
etc.) where age, affiliation, disability, etc.might determine
the ticket price/access rights.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new attribute-based e-ticket
scheme.
The main contributions of our scheme are: (1) Attribute-
based Ticketing: users can buy different tickets depending
on their signed attributes without releasing their exact details;
(2) Unlinkability: two tickets of the same user cannot been
linked ; (3) Untransferability: a ticket can only be used
by the ticket holder and cannot be transferred to another
user; (4) Double Spend Detection: a ticket cannot be double
spent and the identities of users who try can be revealed; (5)
Formal Security Proof: the security of the proposed scheme is
formally proven and reduced to the well-know q-strong Diffie-
Hellman complexity assumption. (6) Performance Evalua-
tion: the performance of our scheme has been measured on
both Android and PC platforms
The novelty of the scheme is that it combines and extends
Camenisch et al. ’s set membership and range proof scheme
[13] allowing a user to prove that her attributes are in some
sets or ranges simultaneously without revealing the exact value
of the attributes. Our scheme thus offers a natural as well as
flexible way of representing user attributes, e.g. to obtain an
age based discount, a user would expect to prove that her age
is in a certain range, while for a disability discount, she would
want to demonstrate her impairment is contained within the set
of recognised disabilities. Furthermore, the user attributes are
additionally signed by a trusted third party thereby allowing a
user’s claimed attributes to also be verified. This is different to
Camenisch’s approach to attribute verification and more suited
to our application domain.
B. Related Work
Mut-Puigserver et al. [5] surveyed numerous e-ticket sys-
tems and summarised their various functional requirements
(e.g. expiry date, portability, flexibility, etc.) and security
requirements (e.g. integrity, authentication, fairness, non-
overspending, anonymity, transferability, unlinkability, etc.).
E-ticket schemes are classified into different types: transfer-
able tickets [6], [7], untransferable tickets [4], [14], multi-
use tickets [4], [5] and single-use tickets [4], [6], [7], [15].
Our scheme falls into the untransferable, single-use tick-
ets categories while providing anonymity, unlinkability, non-
overspending and flexibility.
We now compare our scheme with a number of other
schemes. In these schemes, blind signatures [16], group signa-
tures [17], anonymous credentials [18] and pseudonyms [17],
[19] were used to protect user privacy.
E-Ticket Schemes from Blind Signatures. In a blind signature
scheme, a user can obtain a signature on a message without
the signer knowing the content. Based on the blind signature
scheme proposed by Chaum [16], Fan and Lei [20] proposed
an e-ticket system for voting in which each voter can vote
in different elections using only one ticket. Song and Korba
[9] proposed an e-ticket scheme to protect users’ privacy
and provide non-repudiation in pay-TV systems. Quercia and
Hailes [21] proposed an e-ticket scheme for mobile transac-
tions using Chaum’s blind signature scheme [16] to generate
both limited-use and unlimited-use tickets. Rupp et al. [12],
[22] proposed privacy-preserving pre-payments with refunds
schemes derived from Chaum’s scheme [23] and Boneh et
al. ’s short signature scheme [24]. In their scheme, trip
authorisation tokens were generated using Chaum’s blind sig-
natures, while Boneh et al. ’s short signature scheme was used
to implement the privacy-preserving aggregation of refunds.
Milutinovice et al. [4] proposed an e-ticket scheme which
combines the partial blind signature scheme proposed by
Abe et al. [25], Pedersen’s secret sharing commitment scheme
[26] and Camenisch et al. ’s anonymous credential scheme
[27] to protect user privacy. All these schemes can protect
user privacy and ticket unlinkability, but, unlike our scheme,
they do not support de-anonymisation after double spending
nor ticket untransferability.
E-Ticket Schemes from Group Signatures. A group signature
enables a user to sign a message on behalf of the group
without exposing his identity, while the group manager can
release the identity of the real signer. Nakanishi et al. [28]
proposed an electronic coupon (e-coupon) scheme where the
group signature scheme [29] was used to provide anonymity
and unlinkability. Vives-Guasch [30] proposed an automatic
fare collection (AFC) system in which the group signature
scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [31] was used to pro-
vide unlinkability and revocable anonymity. These schemes
can implement anonymity, de-anonymity, ticket unlinkability
and ticket untransferability, but, unlike our scheme, they
do not support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
While Gudymenko in [10] addressed user privacy as well
as differently priced tickets in his e-ticket scheme and used
group signatures to make tickets unlinkable, no formal security
models and security proofs were presented.
E-Ticket Schemes from Anonymous Credentials. In an
anonymous credential scheme, a user can prove to a verifier
that she has obtained a credential without releasing any other
information. Heydt-Benjamin et al. [7] used anonymous cre-
dentials, e-cash and proxy re-encryption schemes to enhance
the security and privacy of their public transport e-ticket
systems. Arfaoui et al. [8] modified the signature scheme pro-
posed Boneh et al. in [32] to eliminate expensive pairing oper-
ations in the verification phase, and then proposed a privacy-
preserving near field communication (NFC) mobile ticket (m-
ticket) system by combining their modified signature with the
anonymous credential scheme proposed by Camenisch et al.
[33]. In their scheme, a user can anonymously use an m-ticket
at most k times, otherwise the user is revoked by the revocation
authority. These schemes can implement anonymity, ticket
unlinkability as well as ticket untransferability, but, unlike
our scheme, do not support privacy-preserving attribute-based
ticketing. Additionally, the security of these schemes was not
formally proven.
3E-Ticket Schemes from Pseudonyms. Pseudonyms allow
a user to interact with multiple organisations anonymously
and potentially without linkability. Fujimura and Nakajima
[34] proposed a general-purpose e-ticket framework where
anonymity was achieved by using pseudonym schemes [35],
[36]. Jorns et al. [37] proposed a pseudonym scheme which
could be implemented on constrained devices, and then used
it to protect users’ privacy in e-ticket systems. Kuntze and
Schmidt [38] proposed a scheme to generate pseudonym tick-
ets by using the identities embedded in attestation identity keys
(AIKs) certified by the privacy certificate authority (PCA).
Vives-Guasch et al. [39] proposed a light-weight e-ticket
scheme using pseudonyms which also addressed exculpability
(i.e. a service provider cannot falsely accuse a user of having
overspent her ticket, and the user is able to demonstrate
that she has already validated the ticket before using it) and
reusability (i.e. a ticket can be used a predefined number of
times). In [39], pseudonyms were used to provide unlinkability
of users’ transactions. Kerschbaum et al. [11] considered the
privacy-preserving billing issue in e-ticket schemes and ap-
plied pseudonyms to provide unlinkability of user transactions.
These schemes can implement anonymity, ticket unlinkability
as well as ticket untransferability, but, unlike our scheme, they
do not support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
Furthermore, the security of these schemes was not formally
proven.
E-Tickets from Special Devices. There are other e-ticket
schemes designed around special devices, including per-
sonal trusted device (PTD) [40], trusted platform module
(TPM) [38], mobile handsets [41], etc.Unlike our scheme,
these schemes require special devices and do not enable de-
anonymisation after double spending a ticket nor do they
support privacy-preserving attribute-based ticketing.
C. Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section II, the preliminaries used throughout this paper are de-
scribed. The construction and security analysis of our scheme
are presented in Section IV and Section V, respectively. In
Section VI, the performance of our scheme is evaluated.
Finally, Section VII presents our conclusions and future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the formal concepts and notation used
throughout this paper are introduced. The most important
notation is summarised in Table I.
A. Bilinear Groups
Let G1, G2 and Gτ be cyclic group with prime order p. A
map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ is a bilinear group if the following
properties are satisfied [42]:
1) Bilinearity. For all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 and x, y ∈ Zp,
e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = e(g, h)xy;
2) Non-degeneration. For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2,
e(g, h) 6= 1τ where 1τ is the identity element in Gτ ;
3) Computability. For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, there exists
an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
TABLE I
NOTATION
1` A security number
(`) A negligible function in `
CA A central authority
S A ticket seller
U A user
V A ticket verifier
H A cryptographic hash function
P A universal set of ticket policies
PU The policies satisfied by U
Rj The j-th range policy
Si The i-th set policy
Iij The j-th item in Si
σS A credential of S
σU A credential of U
AU The attributes of U
IDU The identity of U
IDS The identity of S
PoK Proof of knowledge
PsU A pseudonym of U
Serv The services requested by U
V PX A validity period for X
MSK The master secret key of the system
params The public parameters of the system
Price The price of a ticket
T icketU A ticket of U
TransT A proof transcript of the ticket T icketU
KG(1`) A secret-public key pair generation algorithm
BG(1`) A bilinear group generator
x
R← X x is randomly selected from the set X
A(x)→ y y is obtained by running the algorithm A(·)
with input x
AU |= Iij AU satisfies the item Iij
(SKS , PKS) A secret-public key pair of S
(SKU , PKU ) A secret-public key pair of U
In the case that G1 = G2, e is called symmetric bilinear map.
Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ) be a symmetric bilinear group
generator which takes as input a security parameter 1` and
outputs a bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) with prime order p and
e : G×G→ Gτ .
Note that Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [43] classified
parings into three basic types and our scheme is based on
the Type-I pairing where G1 = G2. Our scheme uses these
bilinear maps as required by the signatures schemes described
below.
B. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1: (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Assump-
tion [32]) Let BG(1`)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ), g be a generator of G
and x R← Zp. We say that q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption
holds on G if for all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A given (g, gx, gx2 , · · · , gxq ) can output a pair
(c, g
1
x+c ) with negligible probability, namely Advq−SDHA =
Pr
[
A(g, gx, gx2 , · · · , gxq )→ (x, g 1x+c )
]
≤ (`), where c ∈
Zp.
The security of the following two signatures used in our
scheme and thus our overall security can be shown to reduce
to this complexity assumption.
C. Zero-Knowledge Proof
In this paper, we use zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
protocols to prove knowledge of statements about discrete log-
4arithms [44], including discrete logarithm, equality, product,
disjunction and conjunction. We follow the notation proposed
in [29] and formalised in [45]. By
PoK
{
(α, β, γ) : A = gαhβ ∧ A˜ = g˜αh˜γ
}
,
we denote a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of α, β and
γ such that A = gαhβ and A˜ = g˜αh˜γ holds in groups G and
G˜ simultaneously where G = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 and G˜ = 〈g˜〉 = 〈h˜〉.
Conventionally, the values in the parenthesis (α, β, γ) denote
quantities of which knowledge is being proven, while the other
values are public to the verifier.
D. Boneh-Boyen (BB) Signature
In 2004, Boneh and Boyen [32] proposed a short signature
scheme. This scheme was used to construct efficient set-
membership proof and range proof [13]. In this paper, we use
this signature scheme to generate tags for the ticket policies.
The scheme works as follows:
KeyGen. Let BG(1`)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ) and g1, g2 be generators
of G. The signer generates a secret-public key pair (x, Y )
where x R← Zp and Y = gx2 .
Signing. To sign on a message m ∈ Zp, the signer computes
the signature as σ = g
1
x+m
1 .
Verifying. To verify whether σ is a signature on the message
m, the verifier checks e(σ, Y gm2 )
?
= e(g1, g2).
Theorem 1: (Boneh and Boyen [32]) This signature is
(qS , (`))-secure against existentially forgery under the weak
chosen message attacks if the (q, ′(`))-strong Diffie-Hellman
(SDH) assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ), where qS is the
number of signing queries made by the adversary A, q > qS
and ′(`) = (`).
E. Signature with Efficient Proof Protocol
Au et al. [46] proposed a signature with an efficient proof
protocol scheme and referred to it as BBS+ signature. In this
paper, we use their signature scheme to issue credentials to
users and ticket sellers and to generate tickets for users. The
scheme works as follows:
KeyGen. Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,G,Gτ ) and (h, g0, g1, · · · ,
gn+1) be generators of G. The signer generates a secret-public
key pair (x, Y ) where x R← Zp and Y = hx.
Signing. To sign on a block of messages (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) ∈
Znp , the signer selects w, s
R← Zp and computes σ =
(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · gmnn+1)
1
x+w . The signature on (m1,m2, · · · ,mn)
is (w, s, σ).
Verifying. To verify whether (w, s, σ) is a valid signature
on (m1,m2, · · · ,mn), the verifier checks e(σ, Y hw) ?=
e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · gmnn+1, h).
Proof of the Signature. To prove (w, s, σ) is a signature on
(m1,m2, · · · ,mn), the prover selects r1, r2 R← Zp, and
computes A1 = σgr12 and A2 = g
r1
1 g
r2
2 . Let t1 = wr1 and
t2 = wr2. In our scheme, we utilise Au et al.’s [46] honest-
verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol, Π, as
follows:
PoK

(r1, r2, t1, t2, w, s, σ,m1, · · · ,mn) :
A2 = g
r1
1 g
r2
2 ∧Aw2 = gt11 gt22 ∧ e(A1,Y )e(g0,h) =
e(g1, h)
s · e(A1, Y )−w · e(g2, h)r1w·
e(g2, Y )
r1 ·∏n+1i=2 e(gi, h)m−1
 .
Theorem 2: (Au et al. [46] ) This signature with an efficient
proof protocol is (qS , (`))-existentially unforgeable under
the adaptively chosen message attacks if the (q, ′(`))-strong
Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ),
where qS is the number of signing queries made by the
adversary A, q > qS and (`)′ > q(`).
III. FORMAL DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS
In this section, we provide the formal definitions and
security models of our scheme which will be used to verify
its security.
A. Formal Definitions
Our scheme consists of the following four entities: central
authority CA, user U, ticket seller S and ticket verifier V.
• CA authenticates U and S, and issues anonymous cre-
dentials to them;
• S registers to the CA, obtains anonymous credentials
from the CA, and sells tickets to U in accordance with
the ticket policies;
• U registers to the CA, obtains anonymous credentials
from the CA, purchases tickets from S, and proves the
possession of tickets to V;
• V validates the tickets provided by U and detects whether
a ticket is double spent.
The interactions between the different entities in our scheme
is shown in Fig. 1. The algortihms associated with these
interactions are formally defined as follows:
Setup(1`)→ (MSK, params,P). CA inputs 1`, and outputs
MSK, params and P.
Registration. This algorithm consists of the following two
sub-algorithms: S’s registration SRegistration and U’s regis-
tration URegistration.
1) SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS , PKS , params) ↔
CA(MSK,PKS , params)) → (σS , (IDS , PKS)).
S runs KG(1`) → (SKS , PKS) to generate
(SKS , PKS), inputs IDS , (SKS , PKS) and params,
and outputs σS which is generated by CA. CA inputs
MSK, PKS and params, and outputs (IDS , PKS).
2) URegistration(U(IDU , AU , SKU , PKU , params)
↔ CA(MSK,AU , PKU , params)) → (σU , (IDU ,
PKU )). U runs KG(1`) → (SKU , PKU ) to generate
(SKU , PKU ), inputs IDU , AU , (SKU , PKU ) and
params, and outputs σU which is generated by CA.
CA inputs MSK, AU , PKU and params, and outputs
(IDU , PKU ).
5Central Authority (CA)
Ticket Seller (S) User (U)
Verifier (V)
3. Ticket-Issuing:	(!"#,Serv, #,VP,Price)$%&'()#
4. Ticket-Validating:
(!"#,Serv, #,VP, $*+,"-) 5.	Double-
Spend-
DetectingGrant/Deny
1. Setup:	ticket	price	policies:	 ;
master	secrete	key:	MSK;
public	parameters:	params;
Fig. 1. The Model of our scheme
Ticket-Issuing(U(SKU , PKU , AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
params) ↔ S(SKS , PKS , PsU ,P, P rice, V P, Serv,
params)) → (TicketU , (PsU , Service)). This is an
interactive algorithm executed between U and S. U inputs
(SKU , PKU ), AU , σU , PsU , P, V P , Serv and params,
and outputs TicketU . S inputs (SKS , PKS), PsU , P, Price,
V P , Serv and params, and outputs (PsU , Serv).
Ticket-Validating(U(SKU , PsU , T icketU , V P, Serv, params)
↔ V(V P, Serv, params)) → (0/1, (Serv, TransT )). This
is an interactive algorithm executed between U and V. U
inputs (SKU , PKU ), TicketU , V P , Serv and params,
and outputs 1 if TicketU is valid; otherwise it outputs 0
to indicate a failure. V inputs V P , Serv and params, and
outputs (Serv, TransT ).
Double-Spend-Detecting(TransT , params) → (PKU ,⊥).
V inputs TransT and params and outputs PKU if U has
used a ticket twice; otherwise it outputs ⊥.
Definition 2: Our scheme is correct if
Pr

Setup(1`)→ (msk, params,P);
Ticket− SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS ,
Validating PKS , params)↔ CA(MSK,
(U(SKU , PKS , params))→ (σS , (IDS ,
PsU , PKS));
TicketU , URegistration(U(IDU , AU ,
V P, Serv, SKU , PKU , params)↔
params) CA(MSK,PKU , AU , params))
↔ V(V P, → (σU , (IDU , PKU ));
Serv, Ticket− Issuing(U(SKU , PKU ,
params)) AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
→ (1, params)↔ S(SKS , PKS ,
(Serv, PsU ,P, V P, Serv, params))
TransT )) → (TicketU , (PsU , Serv));
AU |= P

= 1
and
Pr

Setup(1`)→ (msk, params,P);
SRegistration(S(IDS , SKS ,
PKS , params)↔ CA(MSK,
PKS , params))→ (σS , (IDS ,
PKS));
Double− URegistration(U(IDU , AU ,
Spend− SKU , PKU , params)↔
Detecting CA(MSK,PKU , AU , params))
(TransT , → (σU , (IDU , PKU ));
params) Ticket− Issuing(U(SKU , PKU ,
→ PKU AU , σU , PsU ,P, V P, Serv,
params)↔ S(SKS , PKS , PsU ,
P, V P, Service, params))→
(TU , (PsU , Service));
AU |= P ∧ TU is double spent.

= 1.
B. Security Model
While Universally Composable (UC) security models [47]
can offer strong security, it is very difficult to construct a
scheme which can be shown to provide UC security. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the existing smart ticketing
schemes was proven in UC security model. Consequently, the
security of our scheme is defined by using the simulation-
based definition as introduced in [48]–[51]. The simulation-
based model is defined by the indistinguishability between the
following “real world” and “ideal world” experiment.
The Real-World Experiment. We first present how our scheme
works where the central authority CA, the ticket seller S,
the user U and the ticket verifier V are honest. The real-
world adversary A can control S, U and V, but cannot
control CA. The entities controlled by A can deviate arbitrarily
from their behaviour described below. CA runs Setup(1`)→
(MSK, params,P) to generate the master secret key msk,
system public parameters params and the universal set P of
ticket polices, and sends params and P to U, S and V.
When receiving a registration message (registration, IDS)
from E , S executes the seller registration algorithm SRegis-
6tration with CA. S runs KG(1`) → (SKS , PKS), takes as
input his identity IDS , the secret-public key pair (SKS , PKS)
and the public parameters params, outputs a credential σS .
CA takes inputs his master secret key MSK, S’s public key
PKS and the public parameters params, and outputs S’s
identity IDS and public key PKS . S sends a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
to E to show whether the SRegistation algorithm succeed
(b = 1) or failed (b = 0).
When receiving a registration message
(registration, IDU , AU ) from E , U executes the user
registration algorithm URegistration with CA. U runs
KG(1`) → (SKU , PKU ), takes as input his identity IDU ,
attributes AU , secret-public key pair (SKU , PKU ) and the
public parameters params, and outputs a credential σU . CA
takes inputs his master secret key MSK, U’s public key
PKU and the public parameters params, and outputs U’s
identity IDU , attributes AU and public key PKU . U sends
a bit b˜ ∈ {0, 1} to E to show whether the URegistation
algorithm succeed (b˜ = 1) or failed (b˜ = 0).
When receiving a ticket issuing message (ticket
issuing,AU , V P, Service) from E , U first checks whether
he has got a credential for AU . If so, U executes the ticket
issuing algorithm Ticket-Issuing with S. U takes as inputs
his secret-public key pair (SKU , PKU ), attributes AU , a
pseudonym PsU , his credential σU , the valid period V P ,
the service Serv and the public parameters params. S takes
as input his secret-public key pair (SKS , PKS), the valid
period V P , the service Serv and the public parameters
params. Finally, U obtains a ticket TU or ⊥ to show failure.
S outputs U’s pseudonym PsU and the service Serv. If the
ticket issue is successful, U sends a bit bˇ ∈ {0, 1} to E to
show the Ticket-Issuing algorithm succeed (bˇ = 1) or failed
(bˇ = 0).
When receiving a ticket validation message
(ticket validating, TU , V P, Serv, params) from E , U
first checks whether he has the ticket TU which includes the
valid period V P and the service Serv. If so, U executes
the ticket validating algorithm Ticket-Validating with V;
otherwise U outputs ⊥ to show he does not have the ticket
TU . If U has the ticket TU , he takes as input his secret-public
key pair (SKU , PKU ), the ticket TU , the valid period V P ,
the service Serv and the system public parameters params,
and outputs a bit bˆ ∈ {0, 1} to show whether the ticket is
valid (bˆ = 1) or invalid (bˆ = 0). V takes input the valid
period V P , the service Serv and the public parameters
params, and outputs the service Serv and the transcript
Trans. Finally, if bˆ = 1, U returns success; otherwise U
returns fail.
When receiving a double spend detecting message
(double spend detecting, Trans, params) from E , V
checks that whether there is a (Trans′, params) with
Trans = Trans′. If so, V returns a bit b¯ = 1 to indicate
that it is a double spend ticket; otherwise b¯ = 0 is returned
to show that the ticket has not been double spent.
The Ideal-World Experiment. In the ideal world experiment,
there are the same entitles as in real world experiment,
including the central authority CA′, ticket seller S′, user U′
and ticket verifier V′. All communications among these entities
must go through a trusted party TP. The behaviour of TP is
described as follows. TP maintains four lists which are initially
empty: a ticket seller credential list, a user credential list, a
ticket list for each user and a ticket validating list.
When receiving a registration message
(registration, IDS′) from S′, TP sends (registration,
IDS′) to CA′ and obtains a bit ν ∈ {0, 1} from CA′. If
ν = 1, TP adds S′ into the ticket seller credential list and
sends ν to S′; otherwise, TP sends ν = 0 to S′ to indicate
failure.
When receiving a registration message
(registration, IDU ′ , AU ′) from U′, TP sends
(registration, IDU ′ , AU ′) to CA′ and obtains a bit
ν˜ ∈ {0, 1} from CA′. If ν˜ = 1, TP adds (U′, AU ′) into the
user credential list and sends ν˜ to U′; otherwise, TP sends
ν˜ = 0 to S′ to indicate failure.
When receiving a ticket issuing message
(ticket issuing, PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) from U′, TP
sends (ticket issuing, PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) to S′ and
obtains a bit νˆ ∈ {0, 1} from S′. If νˆ = 1, TP adds
(U′, AU ′ , PsU , P rice, V P, Serv) into the user ticket list, and
sends νˆ to V′; otherwise, TP sends νˆ = 0 to U′ to indicate
failure.
When receiving a ticket validating message (ticket
validating, TU ′) from V′, TP checks whether TU ′ is in the
user ticket list. If so, TP sends a bit ν¯ = 1 to U′ and puts TU ′
into UV L; otherwise, TP′ sends ν¯ = 0 to indicate failure.
When receiving a double spend detecting message (double
spend detecting, TU ′) from V′, TP checks whether TU ∈
UV L. If it is, TP returns νˇ = 1 to U′ to indicate it is double
spend; otherwise, νˇ = 0 is returned to show it is not double
spent.
The entities CA′, S′, U′ and V′ in ideal world simply relay
the inputs and outputs between E and TP.
Definition 3: Let RealE,A(`) be the probability that the
environment E outputs 1 when running in the real world with
the adversaryA and IdealE,A′ be the probability that E outputs
1 when running in the ideal world with the adversary A′. A
set of cryptographic protocols is said to securely implement
our scheme if |RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤ (`).
Security Properties. We now look at the security properties
of our scheme which the ideal-world experiments can provide.
User’s Privacy. S′ does not know users’ identities and their
exact attributes, namely S′ only knows that a user buys
a ticket for which she has the required attributes. Even if
S′ colludes with V′ and potentially with other users, they
can only try to know the attributes required by the ticket
policies. Furthermore, two tickets for the same users cannot
be linked. Since each user needs to prove that he knows the
corresponding secret key included in a ticket when using the
ticket, he cannot transfer his tickets to others. untransferability.
Seller’s Security.U′ cannot generate a ticket on behalf of the
seller S′. Even if U′ colludes potentially with other users and
V′, they cannot forge a valid ticket. Since a double spend
ticket can be detected and the real user can be identified, U′
cannot double spend a ticket. Therefore, the seller’s security
7includes both unforgeability, double spend detection and de-
anonymization.
In Section V, we prove the indistinguishability between the
real-world experiments and ideal-world experiments and hence
show that the above security properties can be achieved.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF OUR SCHEME
In this section, we describe the formal construction of our
scheme. Our scheme uses a number of ideas and concepts
from Au et al. ’s signature with efficient protocol scheme [46],
Camenisch et al. ’s set-membership proof scheme and range
proof scheme [13], Pedersen’s commitment scheme [26] and
Au et al. ’s e-cash [52] scheme. In particular, we incorporated
Au et al. ’s signature scheme which enables a user to obtain
a signature on a committed block of attributes and prove the
knowledge of the signature in zero-knowledge. This is to issue
credentials to users and ticket sellers and to generate tickets
for users. We adapt Camenisch et al. [13]’s set-membership
proof and range proofs schemes to prove a user’s attributes. In
these schemes, a user can prove to the verifier that an attribute
is in a set or in a range without the verifier knowing the
exact value. In our scheme, these attributes are additionally
certified by a trusted third party as well. Moreover, multiple
sets and ranges were not considered simultaneously, whereas
our scheme does. Pedersen’s commitment scheme is used in
our scheme to hide the knowledge which a prover needs to
prove. And lastly we incorporate Au et al. ’s [52] approach to
detect and de-anonymise a double spend user.
Construction challenges: The schemes described in [46], [52],
[13], [26] form the basis of our construction, the challenge is
to combine and adapt them such that the resulting scheme
provides the following three additional features: (1) The
attributes (e.g. age, disability, etc.) which a user needs to
prove to a ticket seller must be certified by a trusted third
party or otherwise users could simply buy discounted tickets
using attributes which they do not possess. To address this,
Au et al. ’s signature scheme [46] is used to certify a user’s
attributes. As a result, all the values which are included in
the credentials are expressed as discrete logarithm formulas
which can then be proven using the zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge protocol proposed by Bellare et al. in [44].
(2) Tickets need to be untransferable and unlinkable while
doublespend detection must be possible. Thus our tickets are
generated using anonymous credentials (unlinkability) which
include a user’s personal information (untransferability). To
detect a doublespend user, each ticket is includes a serial
number. If two tickets have the same serial number, the public
trace technique proposed by Au et al. in [52] is used to reveal
the user’s identity (via her public key). (3) To provide a high
degree of flexibility for setting ticket policies, Camenisch et
al. ’s range and set-membership proofs [13] must both be
available for use simultaneously. User can then use their
certified attributes to demonstrate membership of multiple
range and set policies, e.g. to get a young-persons discount, a
frequent traveller bonus as well as a disability reduction.
A. High-Level Overview
In our e-ticket system, the type of ticket can be influenced
by two kinds of policies: range and set. Range policies
might include attributes like age, number of journeys made,
salary, etc.; while set policies might consist of various other
attributes, such as profession, disability, location, etc. Our
scheme allows users to anonymously prove their attributes to
a ticket seller and works as follows:
Setup. Figure 2 shows how the scheme is initialised. The ticket
price polices, P, is set to P =
{
R1, · · · ,RN1 ,S1, · · · ,SN2
}
where {R1, · · · ,RN1} are the supported range policies and
{S1, · · · ,SN2} are the supported set policies. The CA selects
the following secret keys MSK = (x, y, µ1, µ2, · · · , µN2)
where x is used to generate credentials for users of the system,
y is used to generate tags identifying the range policies and the
µis (i = 1, 2, · · · , N2) are used to generate tags identifying
the set policies. The CA then publishes it public parameters,
params, which include the ticket price policy, P, together with
the range and and set policy tags as well as a number of other
values required by the scheme.
Registration. The steps involved in the registration process are
shown in Figure 3. The registration of a seller, S, requires S
to generate a secret-public key pair (xs, YS). He sends YS to
the CA as well as a proof of knowledge, Π1S , to demonstrate
he knows the secret key xs. Using some out-of-band channel,
S authenticates himself to the CA and provides evidence that
he is allowed to operate as a seller. If PI1S is valid and the
authentication is successful, the CA computes a credential, σS
as part of a BBS+ signature scheme which includes the public
key YS as well as a validity period for it, V PS . These details
are then sent back to S who uses his private and public keys,
the validity period, V PS , and their associated BBS+ signature
to verify that the CA has authorized him as a seller.
In the case of a user registration, a user U generates a secret-
public key pair (xu, YU ) and submits her public key together
with her a proof of knowledge, Π1U showing that she knows
the secret key, xu. She also sends the CA the list of attributes,
AU , (e.g. age, profession, location, etc.) which allow her to
get discounted tickets. Again, using an out-of-band channel,
she authenticates herself to the CA and provides evidence
for the claimed attributes. If
∏1
U holds, the authentication is
successful and the CA is satisfied with the provided evidence,
it computes a credential σU as part of a BBS+ signature
scheme which includes the public key YU , its validity period
V PU as well as the corresponding range and set tags of the
user’s attributes. These details are sent back to U who uses
them to verify that she is now a legitimate user of the system
and that her attributes have been certified by the CA.
Ticket Issuing. Figure 4 shows the details of the ticket issuing
phase. In order to prevent attackers from collecting users’
private information, a seller S first needs to prove to U that
he is authorised by the CA. This is done by constructing
a proof of knowledge, Π2S involving the seller’s credential
σS . If the proof holds, the user U proceeds by generating
a new pseudonym, Y , which involves her private key xu
and constructs a proof of knowledge, Π2U . This proof shows
8to S that the CA has certified her as a legitimate user
who has the claimed attributes which entitle her to buy the
ticket corresponding to her provided attributes. After S has
successfully verified her proof, he constructs TU applying a
BBS+ signature scheme which includes the user’s pseudonym,
Y , the applicable range and set policies of the user relevant to
the ticket, a serial number to enable double spend detection as
well as the ticket’s price and validity period, V PT . Note that
while the ticket price and its validity period are included in the
construction of TU , they are just free text entries and should
only be used when price and validity periods are required
by the application context, e.g. when the validity period is
important, S should check the user’s credential valid period
V PU and make sure that the ticket valid period V PT is no later
than V PU . TU together with its associated details is then sent
back to the user who can use the information together with
the public key of the seller, YS , to verify the validity of the
information. Note that our scheme provides ticket unlinkability
due to the use of user pseudonyms which prevents the seller, S,
as well as any verifier, V from linking any two ticket requests
by the same user even if they collude.
Ticket Validation. Figure 5 depicts the necessary steps to
validate a ticket. The user U initializes an empty table TableU
to store the identity information of any verifier V. The purpose
of this table is to ensure that a verifier can only ask for a ticket
once to prevent an honest user from being de-anonymised
by a malicious verifier. The verifier V, on the other hand,
initializes an empty table TableV to store the authentication
transcript from U to determine if a ticket has already been used
(i.e. double spend detection). The ticket verification process is
started by the verifier sending a fresh nonce r and its identity,
IDV , to the user. It is assume that there is some out-of-band
channel which allows the user to “authenticate” the verifier,
e.g. it is a guard on the train or a gate at the entrance of the
platform, etc. U first checks that V does not yet have an entry
in TableU . If an entry exists, U aborts the process to avoid de-
anonymisation. Otherwise, she proceeds to send V a “ticket
transcript”, TransT , of her ticket TicketU , which includes
a zero knowledge proof of knowledge, Π3U . The transcript
should convince V that she is a legitimate user who is in
the possession of a valid ticket TicketU . Because TicketU ,
includes the user’s secret key xu as part of her pseudonym,
Y , knowledge of which needs to be demonstrated as part
of Π3U , our scheme ensures ticket untransferability assuming
U’s private key has not been compromised. Moreover, the
transcript also incorporates V ’s nonce r to prevent simple
replay attacks. U completes her part in the validation process
by updating her TableU storing V ’s identity together with r.
If V can successfully verify U ’s ticket transcript, V grants
her access to the service and updates TableV with TransT ;
otherwise, V denies the request.
Double Spend Detecting. Figure 6 shows the double spend
detection process. To determine whether a ticket is being
double spent, V checks TableV for another ticket transcripts,
TransU , with the same serial number, D. If there is, the ticket
is being double spent and V can de-anonymise U by extracting
her public key, YU , from the two transcripts; otherwise, it is
a new ticket.
It is worth pointing out that the construction of our scheme
has the following additional benefit:
Limited Dynamic Policy Update. If the seller S needs to either
update some policies in P or create new ones, he can contact
the central authority CA to update or create the relevant public
parameters params. As a result, when buying a ticket, a user
U proves to S that his attributes satisfy the updated policies
by using the updated params and S will generate tickets
according using the updated policies. U only needs to obtain
new credentials from the CA if her current attributes do not
satisfy the updated policies any more. For example, suppose
that Alice is 16 years old. If the seller S requests that the
existing policy range of [12, 18] is changed to [15, 20] instead,
then Alice can still use her existing credentials. However, if
the policy were changed from [12, 18] to [18, 25] instead, then
Alice would need to get the CA to update her credentials.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The correctness of our scheme is shown in Appendix A. To
demonstrate its security, we need to prove indistinguishability
between the behaviours of the real-world adversary A and the
behaviours of the ideal-world adversary A′. Given a real-world
adversary A, there exist an ideal-world adversary A′ such that
no environment E can distinguish whether it is interacting with
A or A′. The proof is based on sublemmas where different
corrupted parties are considered. The following cases are not
considered: (1) the CA is the only honest party; (2) the CA is
the only dishonest party; (3) all parties are dishonest; and (4)
all parties are honest. The first three do not make a sensible
system while the last one is trivially secure. Since the CA
needs to know U’s attributes to issue her with her credentials,
we assume that CA is honest and fully trusted by the other
entities in the system.
In order to prove the indistinguishability between
RealE,A(`) and IdealE,A′ , a sequence of games Game0,
Game1, · · · , Gamen are defined. For each Gamei, we con-
struct a simulator Simi that runs A as a subroutine and
provides E’s view, for i = 0, 1, · · · , n. HybridE,Simi(`)
denotes the probability that E outputs 1 running in the
world provided by Simi. Sim0 runs A and other honest
parties in the real-world experiment, hence HybridE,Sim0 =
RealE,A. Simn runs A′ in ideal-world experiment, hence
HybridE,Simn(`) = IdealE,A′(`). Therefore,
|RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′ | ≤
∣∣RealE,A(`)−HybridE,Sim1∣∣
+
∣∣HybridE,Sim1 − hHybridE,Sim2 ∣∣+ · · ·+∣∣∣HybridE,Simn−1 −HybridE,Simn ∣∣∣ .
Theorem 3: Our privacy-preserving electronic ticket scheme
with attribute-based credentials described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig.
4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is secure if the q-strong Diffie-Hellamn
assumption (q-SDH) holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ).
Theorem 3 is proven by using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1: (User Privacy) For all environments E and all
real-world adversaries A who statically control the ticket seller
9CA publishes the ticket price polices P = {R1, · · · ,RN1 ,S1, · · · ,SN2} where Rl = [cl, dl] is a range policy (i.e. age,
mileage) and Si = {Ii1 , Ii2 , · · · , Iiς} is a set policy (i.e. location, profession, disbility) and consists of ς items Iij for
l = 1, 2, · · · , N1 and i = 1, 2, · · · , N2.
CA runs BG(1`)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ). Suppose that the longest interval length in {R1, · · · ,RN1} is [0, qk) where q ∈ Zp and
p > 2qk + 1. Let g, g0, g1, g2, g3, gˆ1, gˆ2, · · · , gˆN1 , h, g, η, ξ, ρ, ϑ, η1, η2, · · · , ηN2 be generators of G, H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G be two cryptographic hash functions.
CA selects x, y, µ1, µ2, · · · , µN2 R← Zp and computes g˜ = gx, h˜ = hy, h0 = h
1
y , h1 = h
1
y+1 , h2 = h
1
y+2 , · · · ,
hq−1 = h
1
y+q−1 , h˜0 = h
q0 , h˜1 = h
q, · · · , h˜k−1 = hqk−1 , η˜1 = ηµ11 , η˜2 = ηµ22 , · · · , ˜ηN2 = ηµN2N2 and(
ηi1 = η
1
µi+H(Ii1
) , ηi2 = η
1
µi+H(Ii2
) , · · · , ηiς = η
1
µi+H(Iiς
)
)N2
i=1
.
The secret key of CA is MSK = (x, y, µ1, µ2, · · · , µN2) and the public parameters are params = (e, p,G,Gτ , g, g0,
g1, g2, gˆ1, gˆ2, · · · , gˆN1 , h, g, η, ξ, ρ, g˜, h˜, h0, h1, · · · , hq−1, h˜0, h˜1, · · · , h˜k−1, η1, η2, · · · ,ηN2 , (ηi1 , ηi2 , · · · , ηiς )N2i=1).
Fig. 2. Setup Algorithm
Ticket Seller S Central Authority CA
Selects xs
R← Zp and computes YS = ρxs .
Computes the proof Π1S : PoK{xs : YS = ρxs}.
IDS ,YS ,Π
1
S−−−−−−−→ Selects cs, rs R← Zp and computes
Verifies e(σS , g˜gcs)
?
= e(g0, g) · e(g, g1)H(V PS) cs, rs,←−−−−−−
σS , V PS
σS = (g0g
H(V PS)
1 YSg
rs)
1
x+cs , where V PS is a valid
·e(YS , g) · e(g, g)rs . period.
Keeps the credential CredS = (cs, rs, σS).
User U Central Authority CA
Selects xu
R← Zp and computes YU = ξxu .
Selects r R← Zp and compute R = gr.
Computes the proof Π1U :
PoK {(xu, r) : YU = ξxu ∧ R = gr}. IDU ,YU ,R,−−−−−−−→
AU ,Π1U
Selects cu, r′
R← Zp and computes σU =
Computes ru = r + r′.
cu, r
′,←−−−−−−
σU , V PU
(
g0g
H(V PU )
1 YURg
r′∏N1
l=1 gˆ
al
l
∏N2
i=1 η
H(Iij )
i
) 1
x+cu
Verifies e(σU , g˜gcu) = e(g0, g) · e(g, g1)H(V PU )· where V PU is a valid period, al ∈ AU |= Rl and
e(YU , g) · e(g, g)ru ·
∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al · AU |= Iij .∏N2
i=1 e(ηi, g)
H(Iij ).
Keeps the credential CredU = (cu, ru, σU ). Stores (IDU , AU , YU , σU ).
Fig. 3. Registration Algorithm
S and verifier V, there exists an ideal-word adversary A′ such
that |RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤ 2 1` .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. Since
anonymity, ticket unlinkability and ticket untransferability are
part of user privacy, they are therefore proved by Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: (Seller Security) For all environments E and all
real-world adversaries A who statically controls the verifier V
and one or more users, there exists an ideal-word adversary
A′ such that
|RealE,A(`)− IdealE,A′(`)| ≤ qT2` + qv2` + 1qIAdv
qI-SDH
A (`)
+Adv
(q+1)-SDH
A (`) +Adv
(ς+1)-SDH
A (`) +
1
qT
AdvqT -SDHA (`)
+ 1qV Adv
qV -SDH
A (`),
where qT , qI , qV are the number of ticket issue queries,
credential queries and ticket validation queries made by A,
respectively.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix C. Since un-
forgeability, double spending detection and de-anonymization
are included in the seller security, they are therefore proved
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User: U Ticket Seller: S
Selects z, v R← Zp and computes
Q = σSϑ
z , Z = gzϑv , Zcs = gz
′
ϑv
′
(z′ = zcs, v′ = vcs).
Let PU consists of the names of range polices
Π2S ,V PS←−−−−− Computes the proof Π2S :
and set policies satisfied by U. PoK
{
(cs, rs, σS , z, v) : Z = g
zϑv ∧ Zcs =
Let al ∈ AU , al ∈ [cl, dl),
al − cl, al − dl + qk ∈ [0, qk), gz′ϑv′ ∧ e(Q,g˜)e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) · = e(ρ, g)
xs ·
al − cl =
∑k−1
i=0 wliq
i, al − dl + qk =
∑k−1
i=0 w
′
li
qi, e(g, g)rs · e(Q, g)−cs · e(ϑ, g)csz · e(ϑ, g˜)z
}
.
where wli , w
′
li
∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1].
Selects d, α, β, γ1, γ2, · · · , γN1 , tl0 , tl1 , · · · , tlk−1 ,
t′l0 , t
′
l1
, · · · , t′lk−1 , e1, e2, · · · , eN2
R← Zp.
Computes C = σUϑα, D = gαϑβ , Dcu = gα
′
ϑβ
′
,
Y = ξxugd1 ,
(
Zl = g
γlhal , (Awli = h
tli
wli
,
A′wli = h
t′li
wli
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1,
(
Bij = η
ei
ij
)N2
i=1
,
where α′ = αcu, β′ = βcu.
Computes the proof Π2U :
Π2U ,Y−−−−−→
V PU ,PU
PoK
{(
xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α
′, β′,
(
al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli ,
w′li)
k−1
i=0
)N1
l=1
, (ei, H(Iij )
N2
i=1
)
: Y = ξxugd1
∧Zl = gγlhal ∧ D = gαϑβ ∧ Dcu = gα′ϑβ′
∧ e(C,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PU ) = e(ξ, g)
xu · e(g, g)ru ·∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al ·∏N2i=1 e(ηi, g)H(Iij )·
e(C, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)α′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α
∧(Zlh−cl = gγl∏k−1i=0 h˜wlii
∧Zlh−(dl−qk) = gγ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
w′li
i Selects d
′, su, ωu
R← Zp and computes
∧(e(Awli , h˜) = e(h, h)tli · e(Awli , h)−wli )k−1i=0 TU = (g0Y gd
′
1 g
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
1
xs+ωu where su is
∧(e(A′wli , h˜) = e(h, h)
t′li · e(A′wli , h)
−w′li )k−1i=0
)N1
l=1
a serial number, ψu = H(PU ||Price||Serv
∧
(
e(Bij , η˜i) = e(η, ηi)
ei · e(Bij , ηi)H(Iij )
)N2
i=1
}
||V PT ), Price is the price of the ticket,
Serv are the services which U wants to
Computes du = d+ d′ and checks
TU ,d
′,su,ωu,ψu,←−−−−−−−−−−−
Serv,Price,V PT
access and V PT is a valid period.
e(TU , Ysρ
ωu)
?
= e(g0, ρ) · e(YU , ρ) · e(g1, ρ)du ·
e(g2, ρ)
su · e(g3, ρ)ψu .
Keeps the pseudonym as PsU = ξxugdu1 and
the ticket as TicketU = (du, su, ψu, ωu, TU ,
PU , P rice, Serv, V PT ).
Fig. 4. Ticket Issuing Algorithm
by Lemma 2. Therefore, Theorem 4 is proven because both
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 hold.
VI. BENCHMARKING RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the performance of our scheme.
The source code of the scheme’s implementation is available at
[53] and its performance has been measured on a Dell Inspiron
Latitude E5270 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6600U CPU, 1TB
SSD and 16GB of RAM running Fedora 27. The implemen-
tation makes use of bilinear maps defined over elliptic curves
as well as other cryptographic primitives. We used the JPBC
library [54] for the bilinear maps and bouncycastle [55] for
the other cryptographic required by our scheme. Note that the
Java based implementation of the JPBC API [54] was used
throughout.
Recall from Section II that our scheme requires a Type I
symmetric bilinear map, e : G×G → Gτ . The JPBC library
[54] provides three different instances of a symmetric pairing
with their Type A, A1 or E pairings. The Type A and A1
pairings are based on the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + x over
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User: U Ticket Verifier: V
Initializes an empty table: TableU . Initializes an empty table: TableV .
Checks:
IDV , r←−−−−− Selects r R← Zp
(1) If H(IDV ) ∈ TableU , aborts;
(2) If H(IDV ) 6∈ TableU , goes to the next step.
Selects pi, λ R← Zp and computes
D = gsu , E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu , F = TUϑpi , J = gpiϑλ
and W = Jωu = gpi
′
ϑλ
′
where pi′ = piωu and λ′ = λωu.
Computes the proof Π3U :
PoK
{
(xu, du, su, ωu, pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) : D = gsu ∧ PsU = ξxugdu1
E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu ∧ J = gpiϑλ ∧W = Jωu = gpi′ϑλ′
∧ e(F,YS)
e(g0,ρ)·e(PsU ,ρ)·e(g3,ρ)ψu = e(g2, ρ)
su · e(F, ρ)−ωu ·
e(ϑ, ρ)pi
′ · e(ϑ, ρ)pi
}
.
The proof transcript is: TransT = ((D,E), F, J,W,ψu, PsU
TransT−−−−−−→
PsU ,V PT
Checks ψu
?
= H(PU ||Price||Serv||V PT )
PU , P rice, Serv, V PT ,Π3U ). and the proof
∏3
U .
Updates: TableU = TableU ∪ {H(IDV ), r}. Updates: TableV = TableV ∪ {((r,D,E),
F, J, ψu)}.
Fig. 5. Ticket Validation Algorithm
If there exit two transcripts ((r,D,E), F, J) ∈ TableV and transcript ((r′, D′, E′), F ′, J ′) ∈ TableV with D = D′ and
E 6= E′, the ticket with serial number su is being double spent. Let E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu and E′ = ξxuH ′(IDV )r′su .
To detect the double spend user, V computes E
r′
E′r =
ξxur
′
H′(IDV )r
′rsu
ξxurH′(IDV )r
′rsu = ξ
xu(r
′−r) and YU = ξxu = (E
r′
E′r )
1
r′−r .
Hence, U with public key YU is a double spend user.
Fig. 6. Double Spend Detection
the finite field Fp. In both cases, the group G in is the group
of points on the elliptic curve, E(Fp). The Type E pairing,
on the other hand, is based on the Complex Multiplication
(CM) method of constructing elliptic curves starting with the
Diophantine equation DV 2 = 4p − t2. The details of each
construction can be found in [56].
In our implementation, we use the default parameters during
the instantiation of the different pairings, e.g. Type A is
constructed using rBits = 160, qBits = 512, Type A1 uses
2 primes of size qBits = 512 and Type E is instantiated with
rBits = 160 and qBits = 1024.
Note that according to Table 1 in [57], JPBC’s default
Type A pairing provides approximately the equivalent of 80-
bit symmetric or 1024 RSA-style security. This is sufficient
for providing a baseline for taking time measurements.
For the hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and H ′ :
{0, 1}∗ → G required by our scheme (see Fig 2), we used
SHA256 for H and rely on the implementation of “newEle-
mentFromHash()” method in the JPBC library for H ′.
A. Timings
Table II shows the results of the computational time spent
in the various phases of our proposed scheme which required
more complex computations (i.e. some form of verification
using bilinear maps or generation of zero knowledge proofs).
The timings shown have been calculated as the average over
20 iterations.
The maximum range interval in this instance was 7 which
is covered by the interval [0, 23) and thus k = 3 in the set-up
algorithm described in Fig 2. The maximum set size used was
10. It is clear from the computations involved in the generation
of Π2U (see Appendix D) that the computational cost of a range
proof increases with k while the number of computations for a
set membership proof is independent on the size of the set. As
such the numbers presented below provide a reasonable lower
bound of the computational costs for range proofs assuming
that any useful ranges will have at least an interval length of
4 or more.
Table II shows the timings for our current implementation
of our scheme with 2 small range policies and 4 set policies
using the default instantiation of the three different symmet-
rical pairings available in JPBC. The fastest performance is
achieved by the JPBC Type A curved based Type I pairing,
where ticket issuing and verification take ≈ 2.2s and ≈ 450ms
respectively.
Table III illustrates the impact of different range and set
sizes on the computational effort during the ticket issuing
phase using the JBPC Type A curve. It is clear that set
membership proofs can be computed much faster than range
proofs and their computational cost is independent of the
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TABLE II
BENCHMARK RESULTS (IN MS)
Protocol phase Entity (#range policies,#set policies)= (2, 4)
Type A Type A1 Type E
System Initialisation - Central Authority (CA)
initialise the system CA 626.05.1 9155.95 2895.25
Issuing phase
generate PoK Π2S Seller 184.25 2881.8 469.1
verify Π2S User 107.9 1424.95 286.2
generate ticket request, Π2U User 1008.7 17195.95 2847.35
verify Π2U Seller 787.3 11288.0 2166.25
generate ticket Seller 47.85 583.0 120.3
verify ticket User 52.5 856.75 158.35
Ticket Verification - Verifier (V)
generate ticket transcript TransT User 241.4 3538.7 707.4
verify transcript Verifier 214.05 2539.8 649.8
Total system run time
All phases All 3659.1 54382.95 11383.1
TABLE III
TYPE A: BENCHMARK RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT RANGES AND SET SIZES (IN MS)
Ticket issuing phase k = 5 k = 10 k = 20 s = 10 s = 100
[0, 31] [0, 1023] [0, 1048755] {x|1 ≤ x ≤ 10} {x|1 ≤ x ≤ 100}
range/set proof creation ≈ 512 ≈ 961 ≈ 1998 ≈ 35 ≈ 36
range/set proof verification ≈ 367 ≈ 599 ≈ 1116 ≈ 22 ≈ 23
set size whereas for range proofs the computational effort
increases linearly with k.
However, range proofs provide an additional benefit which
is best illustrated with an example: a young person’s age could
be either codified in a range policy (age ∈ [15, 25]) or with a
set policy (“young person”). Our scheme provides the policy
maker with the flexibility to decide which kind of policies
should be used. While a set policy is computationally more
efficient than a range policy, range policies can potentially
accommodate future policy changes. In particular, suppose that
Alice is 23 years old and the current young person range policy
is given by age ∈ [16, 22] which means Alice cannot obtain
a discount. However, if it is later changed to age ∈ [16, 25],
Alice can still use her existing age attribute of 23 to obtain
a young person discount as she can now prove her age falls
within the updated range. However, if the set policy approach
had been used, Alice would need to return to the CA to update
her credentials as she would not have been eligible for her
signed “young person” attribute, previously.
Consequently, for any real system, it is important to look
at the trade-off between the flexibility that range policies
allow in terms of dynamic updates and their more expensive
computational cost.
Note that our implementation has not yet been optimised
and thus it should be possible to improve its performance
considerably by pre-computing static values off-line where
possible and switching from the current Java-based version
to using a Java-wrapper to the C-based implementation of the
PBC libraries ( [58]), instead. This might also go some way
to ameliorate the computational burden of range policies.
VII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
To protect user privacy in e-ticket schemes, various schemes
have been proposed but which did not address attribute-based
ticketing. This paper presented a scheme which implements
attribute-based ticketing while protecting user privacy. Our
proposed scheme makes the following contributions: (1) users
can buy different tickets from ticket sellers without releasing
their exact attributes; (2) two tickets of the same user cannot
be linked; (3) a ticket cannot be transferred to another user;
(4) a ticket cannot be double spent; (5) the security of the
proposed scheme is formally proven and reduced to well-
known (q-strong Diffie-Hellman) complexity assumption; (6)
the scheme has been implemented and its performance empir-
ical evaluated.
Our future work will be looking at the impact on the security
model and proof when dynamic policy updates are allowed
as well as changes to scheme’s implementation to improve
its performance, e.g. by pre-computing static values where
possible and using the C-based PBC library [58], instead.
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APPENDIX
A. Correctness
We claim that our scheme described in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig.
4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is correct. Using the properties of bilinear
maps, it is trivial to validate that the equations in Fig. 3,
which are used to verify the credentials sent to the seller
and user, hold. Similarly, it is straightforward to verify the
equations in Fig. 6, which are used by ticket verifiers to detect
double spending and de-anonymize users who have double
spent tickets.
We will now demonstrate that the correctness of the equa-
tions in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 also hold true. The former are used
by a user and a ticket seller to prove that they hold valid
credentials, while the latter equations are used by a user to
prove that she holds a valid ticket issued a ticket seller.
To verify the seller proof Π2S , we use the following equality:
e(Q, g˜) = e(σSϑ
z, gx)
= e((g0g
H(V PS)
1 YSg
rs)
x+cS−cS
x+cS , g) · e(ϑ, g˜)z
= e((g0g
H(V PS)
1 YSg
rs), g) · e(σSϑz, g)−cS ·
e(ϑ, g)−cSz · e(ϑ, g˜)z
= e(g0, g)e(g1, g)
H(V PS) · e(ρ, g)xS · e(g, g)rs ·
e(Q, g)−cS · e(ϑ, g)−cSz · e(ϑ, g˜)z.
(1)
Hence, we have
e(Q, g˜)
e(g0, g) · e(g1, g)H(V PS) = e(ρ, g)
xS · e(g, g)rs ·
e(Q, g)−cS · e(ϑ, g)−cSz · e(ϑ, g˜)z.
(2)
Eqs. (1) and (2) are used to show the correctness of the proof
of the ticket issuer’s credential.
Let ∆ = g0 · e(g1, g)H(V P )YUgru
∏N1
l=1 gˆ
al
l
∏N2
i=1 η
H(Iij )
i .
e(C, g˜) = e
(
∆
1
x+cu ϑα, gx
)
= e
(
∆
x+cu−cu
x+cu , g
)
· e(ϑ, g˜)α
= e (∆, g) · e
(
∆
−cu
x+cu ϑ−cuα, g
)
· e(ϑ, g)cuα · e(ϑ, g˜)α
= e (∆, g) · e (C, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)cuα · e(ϑ, g˜)α
= e(g0, g) · e(g1, g)H(V P ) · e(ξ, g)xu · e(g, g)ru ·
N1∏
l=1
e(gˆl, g)
al ·
N2∏
i=1
e(ηi, g)
H(Iij ) · e(C, g)−cu ·
e(ϑ, g)cuα · e(ϑ, g˜)α.
(3)
Hence,
e(C, g˜)
e(g0, g) · eg1, gH(V PU ) = e(ξ, g)
xu · e(g, g)ru ·
N1∏
l=1
e(gˆl, g)
al ·
N2∏
i=1
e(ηi, g)
H(Iij ) · e(C, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)cuα · e(ϑ, g˜)α.
(4)
e(Awi , h˜) = e(h
ti
y+wi , hy) = e(h
tiy+tiwi−tiwi
y+wi , h)
= e(h, h)ti · e(h
ti
y+wi , h)−wi = e(h, h)ti · e(Ai, h)−wi .
(5)
e(A′wi , h˜) = e(h
t′i
y+w′
i , hy) = e(h
t′iy+t′iwi−t′iw′i
y+w′
i , h)
= e(h, h)t
′
i · e(h
t′i
y+wi , h)−w
′
i = e(h, h)t
′
i · e(Ai, h)−w′i .
(6)
e(Bij , η˜i) = e(η
ei
ij
, ηµii ) = e(η
ei
µi+H(Iij
)
, ηµi)
= e(η
eiµi
µi+H(Iij
)
, η) = e(η
ei(µi+H(Iij
)−eiH(Iij )
µi+H(Iij
)
, η)
= e(η, η)ei · e(Bij , η)H(Iij ).
(7)
Eqs. (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are used to show the correctness
of the proof of a user’s credential and his attributes satisfying
the ticket policies.
e(F, YS) = e((g0Y g
d2
1 g
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
1
xs+ωu ϑpi, ρxs)
= e((g0ξ
xugd1g
d′
1 g
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
xs+ωu−ωu
xs+ωu , ρ) · e(ϑ, YS)pi
= e(g0PsUg
su
2 g
ψu
3 , ρ) · e((g0PsUgs2gψu3 )
−ωu
xs+ωu , ρ) · e(ϑ, YS)pi
= e(g0, ρ) · e(PsU , ρ) · e(g2, ρ)su · e(g3, ρ)ψu ·
e((g0PsUg
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
−ωu
xs+ωu ϑ−ωupi, ρ) · e(ϑ, ρ)ωupi · e(ϑ, YS)pi
= e(g0, ρ) · e(PsU , ρ) · e(g2, ρ)su · e(g3, ρ)ψu
e(F, ρ)−ωu · e(ϑ, ρ)ωupi · e(ϑ, YS)pi.
(8)
Hence,
e(F, YS)
e(g0, ρ) · e(PsU , ρ) · e(g3, ρ)ψu = e(g2, ρ)
su ·
e(F, ρ)−ωu · e(ϑ, ρ)ωupi · e(ϑ, YS)pi.
(9)
Eqs. (8) and (9) are used to show the correctness of a ticket
proof generated by a user.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof 1: To simplify this proof, let U be a single honest
user since A can simulate other users by himself.
Game-1. When E first makes a ticket-issuing query, the
simulator Sim1 runs the extractor of the proof of knowledge
PoK

(cs, rs, σS , z, v) : Z = g
zϑv ∧ Zcs = gz′ϑv′
∧ e(Q,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) = e(ρ, g)
xs · e(g, g)rs
·e(Q, g)−cs · e(ϑ, g)csz · e(ϑ, g˜)z
 .
to extract from A the knowledge (xs, cs, rs, σS , z, v) such that
YS = ρ
xs , σS = (g0Ysgrs)
1
x+cs , Q = σSϑz , Z = gzϑv and
Zcs = gzcsϑvcs . If the extractor fails, Sim1 returns E with ⊥
to show the failure; otherwise, Sim1 runs A to interact with
the honest user. The difference between HybridE,Sim0 and
HybridE,Sim1 lies in the knowledge error of the proof of
knowledge, hence
∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1 ∣∣ ≤ 2 1` .
Game-2. The simulator Sim2 works exactly as Sim1 except
that it lets the honest user U to query a ticket for which
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his attributes AU (AU |= P). Due to the (perfect) zero-
knowledgeness of the proof of knowledge, Sim2 generates
a simulated proof of knowledge:
PoK

(
xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α
′, β′, (al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli ,
w′li)
k−1
i=0 )
N1
l=1, (ei, H(Iij ))
N2
i=1
)
: Y = ξxugd1
∧Zl = gγhal ∧D = gαϑβ ∧ Dcu = gα′ϑβ′
∧ e(C,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PU )
= e(ξ, g)xu · e(g, g)ru ·∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al ·∏N2i=1 e(ηi, g)H(Iij )·
e(σ, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)α′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α ∧ (Zlh−cl =
gγ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
wli
i ∧ Zlgˆ−(dl−q
k)
1 = g
γ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
w′
li
i
∧(e(Awli , h˜) = e(h, h)
tl · e(Awli , h)
−wli )k−1j=0 ∧
(e(A′wli , h˜) = e(h, h)
tl · e(A′wli , h)
−w′li )k−1j=0
)N1
l=1
∧
(
e(Bij , η˜i) = e(η, η)
ei · e(Bij , η)H(Iij )
)N2
i=1

.
We have
∣∣HybridE,Sim1 −HybridE,Sim2∣∣ = 0.
Game-3. The simulator Sim3 runs exactly as Sim2, except
that it lets the honest user U to valid his/her ticket. Due to
the (perfect) zero-knowledgeness of the proof of knowledge,
Sim3 generaes a simulated proof:
PoK

(xu, du, su, ωu, pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) : D = gsu∧
PsU = ξ
xugdu1 ∧ E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu
J = gpiϑλ ∧ Jωu = gpi′ϑλ′∧
e(F,YS)
e(g0,ρ)·e(PsU ,ρ)·e(g3,ρ)ψu = e(g2, ρ)
su ·
e(F, ρ)−ωu · e(ϑ, ρ)pi′ · e(ϑ, ρ)pi

.
We have
∣∣HybridE,Sim2 −HybridE,Sim3∣∣ = 0.
Game-4. According to the real-world advesary A, we
construct an ideal-world adversary A′ that plays the
simultaneous roles of the seller S′ and the verifier V′, and
incorporate all steps from Game3. A′ runs A to obtain system
parameters params. When receiving a user U′ registration
query (registration, IDU ′ , AU ′) from the trusted third party
TP, A′ executes the side of the user U with A. If the credential
is valid, A′ sends v˜ = 1 to TP and adds (U′, IDU , A′U )
to the user credential list (UCL); otherwise, ν˜ = 0 is
returned. For the first time that it receives a ticket issue query
(ticket issuing, PsU ′ ,PU ′ , V P, Serv) from TP, it runs A to
obtain the elements (xs, cs, rs, σS , z, v). A′ simulates a honest
user U’s query on (ticket issuing, PsU ′ ,PU ′ , V PT , Serv).
If the ticket is valid, A′ sends νˆ = 1 to TP
adds (PsU ′ ,PU ′ , V PT , P rice, Serv) to the user
ticket list; otherwise, νˆ = 0 is returned to show
failure. When receiving a ticket validating query
(ticket validating, TU ,PU , P rice, V PT ) from TP,
A′ run A to obtain the transcript Trans of the
proof of knowledge of (xu, du, s, ωu, pi, λ, pi′, λ′). If
Trans is valid, A′ sends a bit ν¯ = 1 to TP and
adds (TU , PsU ′ ,PU ′ , V PT , P rice, Serv, Trans) to the
ticket validation list; otherwise, ν¯ = 0 is returned. A′
provides E exactly the same environment as Sim3, hence∣∣HybridE,Sim4 −HybridE,Sim3∣∣ = 0.
Therefore,
∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim4∣∣ ≤ 2 1` .
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof 2: Our PPETS-FGP prevents users from pooling their
credentials, hence we should consider multiple users. Some of
them can be corrupted by A.
Game-1. For each ticket issuing query from a corrupted user
dictated by E , the simulator Sim1 runs the extractor of the
proof of knowledge
PoK

(
xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α
′, β′, (al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli ,
w′li)
k−1
i=0 )
N1
l=1, (ei, H(Iij ))
N2
i=1
)
: Y = ξxugd1
∧Zl = gγhal ∧D = gαϑβ ∧ Dcu = gα′ϑβ′
∧ e(C,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PU )
= e(ξ, g)xu · e(g, g)ru ·∏N1
l=1 e(gˆl, g)
al ·∏N2i=1 e(ηi, g)H(Iij )·
e(σ, g)−cu · e(ϑ, g)α′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α ∧ (Zlh−cl =
gγ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
wli
i ∧ Zlgˆ−(dl−q
k)
1 = g
γ1
∏k−1
i=0 h˜
w′
li
i
∧(e(Awli , h˜) = e(h, h)
tl · e(Awli , h)
−wli )k−1j=0 ∧
(e(A′wli , h˜) = e(h, h)
tl · e(A′wli , h)
−w′li )k−1j=0
)N1
l=1
∧
(
e(Bij , η˜i) = e(η, η)
ei · e(Bij , η)H(Iij )
)N2
i=1

.
to extract (xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α′, β′, (al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli ,
w′li)
k−1
i=0 )
N1
l=1, (ei, H(Iij ))
N2
i=1). If the extractor fails, Sim1
returns ⊥ to E to indicate failure; otherwise, Sim1 runs
A interacting with the honest ticket seller. The difference
between HybridE,Sim0 and HybridE,Sim1 is
|HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1 | ≤
qT
2`
where qT is the number of ticket issue queries.
Game-2. The simulator Sim2 runs exactly as Sim1 ex-
cept that Sim2 returns ⊥ to E if one of the credentials
(cu, ru, σU = Cϑ
−α) is not generated by the Join algorithm.
Actually, (cu, ru, σU = Cϑ−α) is a forged BBS+ signature
[46] on (xu, au, r′u, ((H(Iij )AU |=Iij )
N
i=1). For the case that
multiple corrupted users pool their credentials, one of the
pooled credentials must have a different xu when it was issued
since only a single xu is extracted, hence is a forged credential.
Due to the security of the signature scheme [46], the difference
between HybridE,Sim2 and HybridE,Sim1 is the following
lemma.
Claim 1: We claim that
|HybridE,Sim2 −HybridE,Sim1 | ≤
1
qI
AdvqI−SDHA (`),
where qI is the number of crendentail queries made by the
adversary A.
Game-3. The simulator Sim3 runs exactly as Sim2, ex-
cept that al /∈ [cl, dl]. In this case, there exists at least
one wli /∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1] or w′li /∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1]. If
wli /∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1] or w′li /∈ [0, 1, · · · , q − 1], we have
hwi = A
1
ti
wi = h
1
y+wi or hw′i = (A
′
wi)
1
t′
i = h
1
y+w′
i is a forged
BB signature [32]. The difference between HybridE,Sim3 and
HybridE,Sim2 is bounded by the following lemma.
Claim 2: We claim that
|HybridE,Sim3 −HybridE,Sim2 | ≤ Adv(q+1)−SDHA (`).
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Game-4. The simulator Sim4 runs exact as Sim4 except that
there exists at least an Iij /∈ Si. If Iij /∈ Si, so B
1
ei
ij
= ηij =
η
1
ηi+H(Iij
) is a forged BB signature on H(ij). The difference
between HybridE,Sim4 and HybridE,Sim3 is bounded by
the following lemma.
Claim 3: We claim that
|HybridE,Sim4 −HybridE,Sim3 | ≤ Adv(ς+1)−SDHA (`).
Game-5. The simulator Sim5 runs exactly as Sim4 except
that Sim5 returns tickets to E . At the first ticket issuing query
dictated by E , Sim5 runs the simulated proof of knowledge
PoK

(cs, rs, σS , z, v) : Q = σSϑ
z ∧ Z = gzϑv
∧Zcs = gz′ϑv′ ∧ e(Q,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) =
e(ρ, g)xs · e(g, g)rs · e(Q, g)−cs · e(ϑ, g)csz·
e(ϑ, g˜)z
 .
The tickets (du, ωu, Tu) for each ticket issuing query is com-
puted by using the signing oracle in [46]. The following lemma
is used to bound the difference between HybridE,Sim5 and
HybridE,Sim4 .
Claim 4: We claim that
|HybridE,Sim5 −HybridE,Sim4 | ≤
1
qT
AdvqT−SDHA (`).
where qT is the number of ticket issuing queries made by A.
Game-6. The simulator Sim6 runs exactly as Sim5 except
that Sim6 runs the extractor of the proof of knowledge
PoK

(xu, du, su, ωu, pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) : D = gsu∧
E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu ∧ F = TUϑpi∧
J = gpiϑλ ∧ Jωu = gpi′ϑλ′ ∧ e(F,YS)
e(g0,ρ)e(g3,ρ)ψu
= e(ξ, ρ)xu · e(g1, ρ)du · e(g2, ρ)su ·
e(F, ρ)−ωu · e(ϑ, ρ)pi′ · e(ϑ, ρ)pi
 .
to exact from A the witness (xu, du, s, ωu, pi, λ, pi′, λ′). If the
extraction fails, Sim7 returns ⊥ to E ; otherwise, it continue
to run A interacting with the honest verifier V. The difference
between HybridE,Sim6 and HybridE,Sim5 is
|HybridE,Sim6 −HybridE,Sim5 | ≤
qV
2`
where qV is the number of ticket validation queries.
Game-7. The simulator Sim7 runs exactly as Sim6 except
that Sim7 returns ⊥ to E if at least one of the extracted
(x′u, d
′
u, s
′, ω′u, T
′
U , pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) was not generated by the
Ticket Issuing algorithm. Actually, (ω′u, T
′
U ) is a signature
on (xu, d′u, s
′). For multiple users case, one of the pooled
tickets must have a different x′u than when it was issue since
only one xu is extracted, hence (ω′u, T
′
U ) is a forged signature
on (x′u, d
′
u, s
′). The following lemma is used to bound the
difference between HybridE,Sim8 and HybridE,Sim7 .
Claim 5: We claim that
|HybridE,Sim7 −HybridE,Sim6 | ≤
1
qV
AdvqV −SDHA .
Game-8. Now, based on the real-world adversary A, we
construct an ideal-word adversary A′. A′ runs A to ob-
tain params and YS . After receiving a ticket issue query
(ticket issuing, PsU ′ ,PU ′ , serv, Price, V P ) from TP, A′
runs A to returns a simulated proof of the knowledge:
PoK

(cs, rs, σS , z, v) : Z = g
zϑv ∧ Zcs = gz′ϑv′
∧ e(Q,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) = e(ρ, g)
xs · e(g, g)rs ·
e(Q, g)−cs · e(ϑ, g)csz · e(ϑ, g˜)z
 .
After having extracted (xu, cu, ru, du, α, β, α′, β′, t1, t2,
· · · , tk−1, t′0, t′1, · · · , t′k−1, ((ei, H(Iij ))AU |=Iij )Ni=1) fromA, A′ queries TP to obtain a credential (cu, ru, σU ) for
U′. Next, A′ runs A to generate a BBS+ signature [46]
(su, ωu, Tu) on (xu, du). If the signature can be generated
correctly, TP returns A′ with a bit νˆ = 1; otherwise νˆ = 0
is returned. After receiving a ticket validation query (ticket
validating, TU ′ , PsU ′ ,PU ′ , Serv, Price, V PT ) from V′, A′
runs A to execute the proof of knowledge
PoK

(xu, du, su, ωu, pi, λ, pi
′, λ′) : D = gsu∧
PsU = ξ
xugdu1 ∧ E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu
J = gpiϑλ ∧ Jωu = gpi′ϑλ′∧
e(F,YS)
e(g0,ρ)·e(PsU ,ρ)·e(g3,ρ)ψu = e(g2, ρ)
su ·
e(F, ρ)−ωu · e(ϑ, ρ)pi′ · e(ϑ, ρ)pi

.
If the proof is correct, TP returns A′ with a bit ν¯ = 1 and adds
(TU ′ , PsU ′ ,PU ′ , Serv, Price, V PT ) into the ticket validation
list; otherwise, ν¯ = 0 is returned. After receiving a double
spend detecting query (double spend detecting, TU ′) from
V′, TP checks where TU ′ is in the ticket validation list. If
it is, TP returns V′ with a bit νˇ = 1; otherwise, νˇ = 0 is
returned. A′ provides A with the same environment as Sim7
did, hence we have HybridE,Sim8 = HybridE,Sim7 .
Therefore, we have
|RealE,A − IdealE,A′ | = qT
2`
+
qv
2`
+
1
qI
AdvqI−SDHA (`)
+Adv
(q+1)−SDH
A (`) +Adv
(ς+1)−SDH
A (`)+
1
qT
AdvqT−SDHA (`) +
1
qV
AdvqV −SDHA (`).
Proof of Claim 1. This claim is proven by constructing an
algorithm B that can break the unforgeability under the adap-
tively chosen message attacks of BBS+ signature [46]. From
the security proof presented in [46], there exist a polynomial-
time algorithm B that can break the qI -SDH assumption with
non-negligible advantage.
Suppose that the adversary A can distinguish Game-1 and
Game-2. Given (ρ, ρxs , ρx
2
s , · · · , ρxqIs ). B aims to outpput
(c, ρ
1
xs+c ) where c ∈ Zp and c 6= −xs. Let YS = ρxs .
B sends qI messages (m1,m2, · · · ,mqI ) to the chal-
lenger C, and obtains (σ˜1, σ˜2, · · · , σ˜qI ) where σ˜i = ρ
1
xs+mi
and e(σ˜i, YSρmi) = e(ρ, ρ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , qI . B
selects α˜, β˜, γ˜, a˜, b˜, c˜, d˜ R← Zp, and computes g1 =
((YSρ
α˜)γ˜ρ−1)
1
β˜ = ρ
(xs+α˜)γ˜−1
β˜ , g0 = ρa˜, g2 = gb˜1, g3 = g
d˜
1
and ξ = gc˜1. B sends A (ρ, YS , g0, ξ, g1, g2, g3).
For qI ticket issuing queries, B selects one and referred as
query Q˜ = (PsU ,PU , P rice, Serv, V PU ) where PsU = Y =
ξxugdu1 . For qI − 1 queries other than query Q˜, B responses
using the qI − 1 pairs (mi, σi) as follows.
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Suppose that A queries a ticket on (PsU ,PU , P rice,
Serv, V PT ), since B extracts the knowledge of
(xu, cu, ru, d, α, β, α
′, β′, (al, (tli , t
′
li
, wli , w
′
li
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1,
(ei, H(Iij ))
N2
i=1), B selects d′, su R← Zp, and
computes ψu = H(PU ||Price||Services||V PT ) and
t = xuc˜+ (d
′ + d) + b˜su + d˜ψu and
TU = (g0Y g
d′
1 g
su
2 g
ψu
3 )
1
xs+mi = (g0g
t
1)
1
xs+mi = σa˜i g
t
xs+mi
1
= σa˜i ρ
t((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)
β˜(xs+mi) = σa˜i (ρ
(xs+α˜)γ˜−1
(xs+mi) )
t
β˜
= σa˜i (ρ
(xs+mi−mi+α˜)γ˜−1
(xs+mi) )
t
β˜ = σa˜i ρ
t˜γ
β˜ σ
t((α˜−mi)γ˜−1)
β˜
i
where mi ∈ {m1,m2, · · · ,mqI}.
For the query Q˜ where Y˜ = ξx˜gd˜1 , B computes ψ˜ =
H(PU˜ ||Price||Serv||V PT ) and selects d˜′, s˜ ∈ Zp such that
d˜′ + d˜+ c˜x˜+ b˜s˜+ d˜ψ˜ = a˜β˜ and computes
T˜ = (g0Y˜ g
d˜′
1 g
s˜
2g
ψ˜
3 )
1
xs+α˜ = e(g0g
c˜x˜+d˜+d˜′+b˜s˜+d˜ψ˜
1 )
1
xs+α˜
= (ρa˜ρ
((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)(c˜x˜+d˜+d˜′+b˜s˜+d˜ψ˜)
β˜ )
1
xs+α˜
= (ρ
((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)(c˜x˜+d˜+d˜′+b˜s˜)+a˜β˜
β˜ )
1
xs+α˜
= (ρ
((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)a˜β˜+a˜β˜
β˜ )
1
xs+α˜ = ργ˜a˜.
B repondes A with (a˜β˜− d˜− c˜x˜− b˜s˜− d˜ψ˜, s˜, ψ˜, α, T˜ ) where
ψ˜ = H(PU˜ ||Price||Serv||V PT ). Finally, A output a forged
tickets (d˜∗, s∗, ψ∗, ω∗, T ∗) for (Y ∗,PU∗ , price, Serv, V P )
where ψ∗ = H(PU∗ || Price||Serv||V PT ), Y ∗ = ξx∗gd∗1 and
T ∗ = (g0Y ∗gd˜
∗
1 g
s∗
2 g
ψ∗
3 )
1
xs+ω∗ . B runs A to extract (x∗, d∗)
from the proof of
∏2
U∗ . We consider the following cases.
Case-I (ω∗ /∈ (m1,m2, · · · ,mqI , α˜)): Let t∗ = c˜x∗ + d∗ +
d˜∗ + b˜s∗ + d˜ψ∗.
T ∗ = (g0Y ∗gd˜
∗
1 g
s∗
2 g
ψ∗
3 )
1
xs+ω∗ =
(g0g
c˜x∗+d∗+d˜∗+b˜s∗+d˜ψ∗
1 )
1
xs+ω∗ = (ρa˜ρ
t∗((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)
β˜ )
1
xs+ω∗
= ρ
a˜
xs+ω∗ ρ
t∗((xs+α˜)γ˜−1)
β˜(xs+ω∗) = ρ
a˜
xs+ω∗ ρ
t∗((xs+ω∗−ω∗+α˜)γ˜−1)
β˜(xs+ω∗)
= ρ
a˜
xs+ω∗ ρ
t∗γ˜
β˜ ρ
t∗(α˜−ω∗)γ˜
β˜(xs+ω∗) ρ
−t∗
β˜(xs+ω∗) .
We have T ∗ρ
−t∗γ˜
β˜ = ρ
a˜β˜+t∗(α˜−ω∗)γ˜−t∗
β˜(xs+ω
∗) and
ρ
1
xs+ω∗ = (T ∗ρ
−t∗γ˜
β˜ )
β˜
a˜β˜+t∗(α˜−ω∗)γ˜−t∗ . B outputs
(ω∗, (T ∗ρ
−t∗γ˜
β˜ )
β˜
a˜β˜+t∗(α∗−ω∗)γ˜−t∗ ).
Case-II (ω∗ = mi and T ∗ = Ti) or (ω∗ = α˜ and T ∗ = T˜ ):
These happen with negligible probability except that A can
solves the related discrete logarithms amongst off g0, g1, g2, g3
and ξ.
Case-III (ω∗ ∈ (m1,m2, · · · ,mqI , α˜)) and T ∗ 6= Ti or T ∗ 6=
T˜ : If it is, ω∗ = α˜ with the probability 1qI . Let t
∗ = c˜x∗ +
d∗ + d˜∗ + b˜s∗ + d˜ψ∗. We have ρ
1
xs+ω∗ = (T ∗ρ
−t∗γ˜
β˜ )
β˜
a˜β˜−t∗ . B
outputs (ω∗, (T ∗ρ
−t∗γ˜
β˜ )
β˜
a˜β˜−t∗ ).
Therefore,
∣∣HybridE,Sim2(`)−HybridE,Sim1(`)∣∣ ≤
Adv
qI−SDH
A (`)
qI
.
Proof of Claim 2. This claim is proven by constructing
an algorithm B that can break the unforgeability under the
weak chosen message attacks of BB signature [32]. By the
security proof given in [32], there exists an polynomial-time
algorithm B that can break the (q + 1)-SDH assumption with
non-negligible advantage.
Suppose that an adversary A can distinguish Game-
2 and Game-3. Given (h, hy, hy
2
, · · · , hyq+1), B aims to
output (c, h
1
y ) where c ∈ Zp and c 6= −y. Re-
ceiving q messages {0, 1, · · · , q − 1} from A, B com-
putes f(y) =
∏q
j=0(y + j) =
∑q
j=0 pijy
j , yf(y) =∑q+1
j=1 φjy
j and fi(y) =
f(y)
y+i =
∑q−1
j=0 $jy
j where
pi0, · · · , φq, φ1, · · · , φq+1, $0, · · · , $q−1 ∈ Zp. B computes
hˆ = hf(y) =
∏q
j=0(h
yj )pii , h˜ = hˆy = hyf(y) =∏q
j=0(h
yj+1)pij and hi = hˆ
1
y+i = h
f(y)
y+i
∏q−1
j=0(h
yj )$i for
i = 0, 2, · · · , q−1. B sends (hˆ, h˜, h1, h2, · · · , hq) to A. Since
B extracts (xu, au, cu, ru, du, α, β, α′, β′, (ti, t′i, ωi, ω′i)k−1i=0 ,
((ei, H(Iij ))AU∈Iij )
N
i=1) with e(Awi , h˜) = e(h, h)
ti ·
e(Awi , h)
−wi and e(A′wi , h˜) = e(h, h)
ti · e(A′wi , h)−w
′
i .
Hence, hwi = (Awi)
1
ti = hˆ
1
y+wi or hwi = (A
′
wi)
1
t′
i = hˆ
1
y+w′
i .
When wi /∈ {0, 1, · · · , k− 1}, let f(y) = c(x) · (x+wi) + γ,
where γ 6= 0 and c(x) = ∑q−1j=0 %jyj is a (q−1)-degree poly-
nomial. We have hwi = hˆ
1
y+wi = h
f(y)
y+wi = h
γ+c(x)·(x+wi)
y+wi =
h
γ
y+wi ·∏q−1j=0(hyj )%j and h 1y+wi = (hwi∏q−1j=0(hyj )−ψj ) 1γ =
((Awi)
1
ti
∏q−1
j=0(h
yj )−%j )
1
γ . Finally, B outputs (wi, h
1
y+wi ).
Therefore,∣∣HybridE,Sim3 −HybridE,Sim2∣∣ ≤ Adv(q+1)−SDHA (`).
Proofs of Claim 3, 4, 5. The proof of Claim 3 is similar to
the proof of Claim 2. The proofs of Claim 4 and 5 is similar
as the proof of Claim 1.
D. The Details of Zero-Knowledge Proof
The details of zero-knowledge proofs used in our PPETS-
FGP are described by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [59] as
follows.
The Detail of
∏1
S:
S select ts
R← Zp and M1S R← G, and computes TS = ρts ,
c = H(M1S ||YS ||TS) and s = ts−cxs. S sends (c, s,M1S , YS)
to CA.
CA verifies c ?= H(M1S ||YS ||ρsY cS ).
The Detail of
∏1
U :
U select x˜, r˜ R← Zp and M1U R← G, and computes Y ′U = ξx˜,
R′ = gr˜, c1 = H(M1U ||YU ||Y ′U ), c2 = H(M1U ||R||R′), s1 =
x˜−c1xu and s2 = r˜−c2r. U sends (M1U , YU , R, c1, c2, s1, s2)
to CA.
CA verifies c1
?
= H(M1U ||YU ||ξs1Y c1U ) and c2 =
H(M1U ||R||gs2Rc2).
The Detail of
∏2
S:
S selects z, v, z˜, v˜, zˆ, vˆ, x˜s, v˜s, c˜s
R← Zp and M2S R← G, and
computes
Q = σSϑ
z, Z = gzϑv, Γ = gzcsϑccs = gz
′
ϑv
′
, Z ′ = gz˜ϑv˜,
Γ′ = gzˆϑvˆ, Ω =
e(Q, g˜)
e(g0, g) · e(g1, g)H(V PS) , Ω
′ = e(ρ, g)x˜s ·
e(g, g)v˜s · e(Q, g)−c˜s · e(ϑ, g)zˆ · e(ϑ, g˜)z˜,
18
c˜1 = H(M
2
S ||Z||Z ′), s˜1 = z˜ − c˜1z, s˜2 = v˜ − c˜1v,
c˜2 = H(M
2
S ||Γ||Γ′), sˆ1 = zˆ − c˜2z′, sˆ2 = vˆ − c˜2v′,
c˜3 = H(M
2
S ||Ω||Ω′), r˜1 = x˜s − c˜3xs, r˜2 = v˜s − c˜3rs,
r˜3 = c˜s − c˜3cs, r˜4 = zˆ − c˜3z′, r˜5 = z˜ − c˜3z.
S sends (M2S , Q, Z,Γ,Ω, c˜1, s˜1, s˜2, c˜2, sˆ1, sˆ2, c˜3, r˜1, r˜2,
r˜3, r˜4, r˜5, V PS) to U.
U verifies: Ω ?= e(Q,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PS) ;
c˜1
?
= H(M2S ||Z||gs˜1ϑs˜2Z c˜1); c˜2 ?= H(M2S ||Γ||gsˆ1ϑsˆ2Γc˜2);
c˜3
?
= H(M2S ||Ω||e(ρ, g)r˜1 · e(g, g)r˜2 · e(Q, g)−r˜3 · e(ϑ, g)r˜4 ·
e(ϑ, g˜)r˜5 · Ωc˜3).
The Detail of
∏2
U :
U selects d, α, β, (γl, γ˜l, a˜l, (tli , t′li)
k−1
i=0 )
N1
l=1, (ej , e˜j , e˜
′
j ,
eˇj)
N2
j=1, d˜, x˜u, r˜u, c˜u, α˜, β˜, c˜, ((t˜li , t˜
′
li
, w˜li , w˜
′
li
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1
R← Zp
and M2U
R← G, and computes
C = σUϑ
α, D = gαϑβ ,Φ = Dcu = gαcuϑβcu = gα
′
ϑβ
′
,
Y = ξxugd1 ,
(
Zl = g
γlhal , Z ′l = g
γ˜lha˜l , Z˜l = g
γ˜l
k−1∏
i=0
h˜
w˜li
i ,
Z˜ ′l = g
γ˜l
k−1∏
i=0
h˜
w˜′li
i ,
(
Awli = h
tli
wli
, A′wli = h
t′li
w′li
, Vli =
e(h, h)tli · e(Awli , h)−wli , V˜li = e(h, h)t˜li · e(Awli , h)−w˜li ,
V ′li = e(h, h)
t′li · e(A′wli , h)
−w′li , V˜ ′li = e(h, h)
t˜′li ·
e(A′wli , h)
−w˜′li )k−1i=0
)N1
l=1
, D˜ = gα˜ϑβ˜ ,
Φ˜ = Dc˜ = gα˜
′
ϑβ˜
′
(α˜′ = c˜α, β˜′ = c˜β), Y˜ = ξx˜ugd˜1 ,
R =
e(C, g˜)
e(g0, g) · e(g1, g)H(V PU ) ,
R′ = e(ξ, g)x˜u · e(g, g)r˜u ·
N1∏
l=1
e(gˆl, g)
a˜l ·
N2∏
i=1
e(ηi, g)
eˇi · e(C, g)−c˜u · e(ϑ, g)α˜′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α˜,(
Bij = η
ei
ij
,Wij = e(Bij , η˜i), W˜ij = e(η, ηi)
e˜i ·
e(Bij , ηi)
e˜′i
)N2
i=1
,
c¯ = H
(
M2U ||Y ||Y˜ ||D||D˜||Φ||Φ˜||C||R||R′||Z1|| · · · ||ZN1 ||
Z ′1|| · · · ||Z ′N1 ||B11 || · · · ||B1ζ || · · · ||BN21 || · · · ||BN2ζ ||
W11 || · · · ||W1ζ || · · · ||W21 || · · · ||WN2ζ ||W˜11 || · · · ||W˜1ζ ||
· · · ||W˜N21 || · · · ||W˜N2ζ
)
, x¯u = x˜u − c¯xu, d¯ = d˜− c¯d,
r¯u = r˜u − c¯ru, (γ¯l = γ˜l − c¯γl, a¯l = a˜l − c¯al)N1l=1,
(eˆi = e˜i − c¯ei, eˆ′i = eˇi − c¯H(Iij ), eˆ′′i = eˇi + c¯H(Iij ))N2i=1,
c¯u = c˜u − c¯cu, α¯ = α˜− c¯α, β¯ = β˜ − c¯β, α¯′ = α˜′ − c¯α′,
β¯′ = β˜′ − c¯β′, (e¯l = H(M2U ||Zl||Z ′l ||Z˜l||Z˜ ′l), γˇl = γ˜l−
e¯lγl, aˇl = a˜l − e¯l(al − cl), aˇ′l = a˜l − e¯l(al − dl + qk),
(w¯li = w˜li − e¯lwli , w¯′li = w˜′li − e¯lw′li)k−1i=0
)N1
l=1
,(
(d¯li = H(M
2
U ||Awli ||A′wli ||Vli ||V
′
li ||V˜li ||V˜ ′li),
t¯li = t˜li − d¯litli , t¯′li = t˜′li − d¯lit′li , wˆli = w˜li − d¯liwli ,
wˆ′li = w˜
′
li − d¯liw′li)k−1i=0
)N1
l=1
,
U sends S:(
C,D,Φ, Y, R, (Zl, (A˜wli , A˜
′
wli
, Vli , V˜li , V
′
li
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1,
(Bij ,Wij )
N2
i=1, c¯, x¯u, d¯, r¯u, c¯u, α¯, β¯, α¯
′, β¯′, (e¯l, γ¯l, a¯l, γˇl,
aˇl, a¯
′
l)
N1
l=1, (eˆi, eˆ
′
i)
N2
i=1((w¯li , w¯
′
li
, wˆli , wˆ
′
li
, d¯li , t¯li , t¯
′
li
)k−1i=0 )
N1
l=1,
V PU ,PU
)
.
S verifies: R ?= e(C,g˜)
e(g0,g)·e(g1,g)H(V PU ) ;
c¯
?
= H
(
M2U ||Y ||ξx¯ugd¯1Y c¯||D||gα¯ϑβ¯Dc¯||Φ||gα¯′ϑβ¯′Φc¯||C||R||
e(ξ, g)x¯u · e(g, g)r¯u ·
N1∏
l=1
e(gˆ, g)a¯l ·
N2∏
i=1
e(ηi, g)
eˆ′i · e(C, g)−c¯u ·
e(ϑ, g)α¯
′ · e(ϑ, g˜)α¯ ·Rc¯||Z1|| · · · ||ZN1 ||gγ¯1ha¯1Z c¯1|| · · · ||
gγ¯N1ha¯N1Z c¯N1 ||B11 || · · · ||B1ζ || · · · ||BN21 || · · · ||BN2ζ ||W11 ||
· · · ||W1ζ || · · · ||WN21 || · · · ||WN2ζ ||e(η, η1)eˆ1 · e(B11 , η1)eˆ
′′
1 ·
W c¯11 || · · · ||e(η, η1)eˆ1 · e(B1ζ , η1)eˆ
′′
1 ·W c¯1ζ || · · · ||e(η, ηN2)eˆN2 ·
e(BN21 , ηN2)
eˆ′′N2 ·W c¯N21 || · · · ||e(η, ηN2)
eˆN2 · e(BN2ζ , ηN2)
eˆ′′N2
·W c¯N2ζ
)
,
(
e¯l = H
(
M2U ||Zl||gγˇll haˇl(Zlh−cl)e¯l ||
gγˇl
k−1∏
i=0
h˜
w¯li
i (Zlh
−cl)e¯l ||gγˇl
k−1∏
i=0
h˜
w¯′li
i (Zlh
−d1+qk)e¯l
))N1
l=1
,((
d¯li = H(M
2
U ||Awli ||A′wli ||Vli ||V
′
li ||e(h, h)t¯li · e(Awli , h)−wˆli ·
V
d¯li
li
||e(h, h)t¯′li · e(A′wli , h)
−wˆ′li · (V ′li)d¯li )
)k−1
i=0
)N1
l=1
The Detail of
∏3
U :
U selects pi, λ, x˜u, s˜u, p˜i, p˜i′, λ˜′, ω˜u, d˜u
R← Zp and M3U R← G,
and computes
D = gsu , D˜ = gs˜u , PsU = ξ
xugdu1 , P˜ sU = ξ
x˜ugd˜u1 ,
E = ξxuH ′(IDV )rsu , E˜ = ξx˜uH ′(IDV )rs˜u , F = TUϑpi,
J = gpiϑλ, J˜ = gp˜iϑλ˜, J ′ = Jωu = gpiωuϑλωu ,
J˜ ′ = J ω˜u = gpiω˜uϑλω˜u , R =
e(F, YS)
e(g0, ρ) · e(PsU , ρ) · e(g3, ρ)ψu ,
R˜ = e(g2, ρ)
s˜u · e(F, ρ)−ω˜u · e(ϑ, ρ)p˜i′ · e(ϑ, YS)p˜i,
c = H(M3U ||D||PsU ||E||J ||J ′||R||D˜||P˜ sU ||E˜||J˜ ||J˜ ′||R′),
s¯u = s˜u − csu, x¯u = x˜u − cxu, sˆu = rs˜u − crsu, p¯i = p˜i − cpi,
λ¯ = λ˜− cλ, ω¯u = ω˜u − cωu, p¯i′ = p˜i′ − cpiωu and d¯u = d˜u − cdu.
U sends (PU , P rice, Serv, V PT ,M3U , D, PsU , E, F, J, J ′, R, c, s¯u,
x¯u, sˆu, p¯i, λ¯, ω¯u, p¯i
′, d¯u) to V.
V verifies: ψu
?
= H(PU ||Price||Serv||V PT ),
R
?
=
e(F, YS)
e(g0, ρ) · e(PsU , ρ) · e(g3, ρ)ψu ,
and
c
?
= H
(
M3U ||D||E||J ||J ′||R||gs¯uDc||ξx¯ugd¯u1 PscU ||
ξx¯uH ′(IDV )sˆuEc||gp¯iϑλ¯Jc||J ω¯uJ ′c||e(g2, ρ)s¯u ·
e(F, ρ)−ω¯u · e(ϑ, ρ)p¯i′ · e(ϑ, YS)p¯iRc
)
.
